748053.1.01 9/24/2007 6:40:57 PM -2 -No-Fault affiliated limited liability company, NF Member, LLC ("NF Member"). The documents evidencing and securing the Mortgage Loan (the "Mortgage Loan Documents") are standard securitization documents for large loans. They were heavily negotiated with some wins for the lender and some wins for the borrower, but nothing the rating agencies or, indeed, any subordinate bond purchaser in a securitization would reject out of hand. The Mortgage Loan Documents provide for a "springing" cash management regime where, if the Borrower should be in default of its obligations under the Mortgage Loan Documents or if the debt service coverage ratio for the Property falls below 1.20x (on a three month trailing basis), Risk Taker will use presigned tenant direction letters to redirect rent checks to a lockbox account controlled by lender.
The Mortgage Loan is non-recourse to the Borrower, but contains standard non-recourse carveouts for "bad boy" acts (including a voluntary bankruptcy, but in that instance, liability runs only to the Borrower). No-Fault has executed a guaranty over some of these non-recourse carveouts, pursuant to which it is liable for the intentional fraud and similar conduct of the Borrower. Risk Taker made certain to negotiate into the Mortgage Loan Documents the right to require the Borrower to submit budgets and other detailed financial reporting, and the right to kick out the manager of the property once a default occurs. Risk Taker believes its Mezzanine Loan is also "typical" (i.e., it looks like the last mezzanine deal that counsel for Risk Taker put together last year), and is secured by NF Member's pledge of 100% of its equity interests in the Borrower. Whigg is planning on issuing these securities off of a shelf, using its trusty depositor entity, which will purchase the A Note from Risk Taker pursuant to a Mortgage Loan Purchase Agreement (the "MLPA"). Risk Taker and its counsel discuss the representations and warranties Risk Taker is required to make concerning the Mortgage Loan contained in the MLPA, but hey, they're the "standard market reps," and there is profit to be had so no one is really in the mood Risk Taker ultimately manages to sell its interest under the B Note to a European pension fund it advises, the Naïve Pension Fund ("Naïve Pension"). Naïve Pension negotiates no substantive changes into the Participation Agreement. The B Note is, for the sake of convenience, serviced by Masterful (who is happy to increase its fee for this additional service) pursuant to special provisions in the PSA. Event" states that if a borrower under a loan in the pool is delinquent in making a required payment for more than sixty days, a Special Servicing Transfer Event will be deemed to have occurred. On the other hand, the Borrower is assuring Masterful that "things will be fine next month"; that they'll make up the missed payment; that under the circumstances "the waiver makes sense"; that "Bogus is good for the money"; that the bankruptcy proceeding will undoubtedly result in the reaffirmation of the lease by Bogus and reversal of the reserve shortfall within the next thirty days and, indeed, because Bogus will be affirming the lease in bankruptcy, overall levels of reserves can actually be reduced and this is simply in anticipation of that event.
Masterful carefully weighs its options. The two Masterful portfolio managers responsible for the 2001-BIG1 Securitization are called into the vice president of portfolio management's office. "If we declare a special servicing transfer event," observes one of the portfolio managers, "the servicing of this Loan will be transferred to Really Special and we'll lose a lot of our float off of the reserves-after all, we're only getting two bips for this deal."
The other portfolio manager adds that "apart from not wanting to lose the interest income, we In midtown, at MegaLeverage's offices, the first call goes out to its counsel.
"Can we really execute on the equity pledge securing our senior mezzanine position quickly, like you told us when we closed the loan?" asks MegaLeverage's investment officer responsible for the purchase of this position. MegaLeverage's counsel begins to prevaricate because, having done dozens of these mezzanine loans and mezzanine loan participations over the years, it never actually had to enforce one (at least since 1993). With some trepidation, counsel does its best to Everyone is in a tizzy over at Naïve Pension. No one is telling them anything, but they know something's wrong. Naïve Pension and its counsel are now fretting over the terms of the Participation Agreement Naïve Pension assumed at closing, which prohibits it from taking any action with respect to the B Note or even having any contact with the Borrower. Naïve Pension's counsel informs it that Naïve Pension has absolutely no ability to do anything except whine and pout, unless, of course, they choose to buy the A Note, which they may do at par and in accordance with the Participation Agreement and PSA. Someone at Naïve Pension mumbles about "throwing good money after bad," and what are they going to tell them at headquarters. Naïve Pension's top executive in North America decides that "there is simply nothing to do at this juncture, other than pray that this whole problem goes away." Ultimately, Naïve Pension decides to make it absolutely clear to Risk Taker and Bigg Whigg that if Naïve Pension takes a loss on this transaction, there will be hell to pay. Recognizing that they are (as they say in the Bush administration) a "heartbeat away" from being the controlling class and having the ability under the PSA to select the operating advisor (and, more importantly, the special servicer), representatives of the Slightly Less Subordinated Bondholder meet with counsel. The Slightly Less Subordinated Bondholder view is that Really Special is trying to hold on to the control of the most subordinate bonds (and therefore, the special servicing) and its relationship with the Borrower in a continual victory of optimism over common sense. Consequently, in furtherance of its plans to strip Really Special of its control rights over the operating advisor, the Slightly Less Subordinated Bondholder directs its counsel to draft, but not yet deliver, a letter to Masterful demanding that the appraisal reduction process be commenced immediately. The Slightly Less Subordinated Bondholder decides to keep the demand letter in its hip pocket, but at the ready, pending the next move of Really Special. This is, of course, a work of speculative fiction. To a degree, the most base of motivations have been ascribed to the players to make a point about the complexities of interests and legal arrangements in which a troubled securitized loan is imbedded. What happens next is your guess. Want to speculate?
